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Abstract
We study a simple model of an asset market with informed and non-informed agents.
In the absence of non-informed agents, the market becomes information efficient when
the number of traders with different private information is large enough. Upon in-
troducing non-informed agents, we find that the latter contribute significantly to the
trading activity if and only if the market is (nearly) information efficient. This sug-
gests that information efficiency might be a necessary condition for bubble phenomena
– induced by the behavior of non-informed traders – or conversely that throwing some
sands in the gears of financial markets may curb the occurrence of bubbles.
1 Introduction
Financial markets have increased tremendously in size and complexity in the last decades,
with the proliferation of hedge funds and the expansion of derivative markets. Within
the neo-classical paradigm, the expansion in the diversity of traders and in the repertoire
of financial instruments is, generally, enhancing the efficiency of the market (see however
[1], [2]). Indeed unfettered access to trading in financial markets makes more liquidity
available and it eliminates arbitrages, thus pushing the market closer to the theoretical
limit of perfectly competitive, informationally efficient markets. Likewise, the expansion in
the repertoire of trading instruments provides a wider range of possibilities to hedge risks
and it drives the system closer to the theoretical limit of dynamically complete markets
[3]. Both conclusions rely on non-trivial assumptions, notably the absence of information
asymmetries. Indeed, financial stability is related to the effects of asymmetric information
and most of the responsibility for market failures is, in one way or another, usually put
on market imperfections1. Market imperfections are inevitable even in stable periods, so a
1According to F.S. Mishkin ”Financial instability occurs when there is a disruption to financial markets
in which asymmetric information and hence adverse selection and moral hazard problems become much
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relevant question is to understanding when deviations from ideal conditions are amplified
by the internal dynamics of the market, leading to a full blown crisis.
This paper suggests that the more markets are close to ideal conditions, the more they
are prone to the proliferation and amplification of market imperfections. This point has
already been made in the literature [7, 8, 9] concerning the expansion in the repertoire of
financial instruments2.
Here we address the issue of stability, in relation to information efficiency. Information
efficiency refers to the ability of the market to allocate investment to activities which
provide profitable return opportunities. In brief, traders who have a private information
on the performance of an asset will buy or sell shares of the corresponding stock in order to
make a profit. As a result, prices will move in order to incorporate this information, thus
reducing the profitability of that piece of information. In equilibrium, when all informed
traders are allowed to invest, prices must be such that no profit can be extracted from the
market.
In this respect, markets behave as information processing and aggregating devices and,
in the ideal limit, market prices are expected to reflect all possible information: this is the
content of the celebrated Efficient Market Hypothesis [10]. Paradoxically, however, when
markets are really informationally efficient, traders have no incentive to gather private
information, because prices already convey all possible information. Hence, as realized long
ago [11], traders’ behavior does not transfer any information into prices, which implies that
efficient markets cannot be realized.
The interplay between informed and non-informed traders is one of the key elements in
explaining market dynamics. Informed traders , so-called fundamentalists, typically have a
stabilizing effect whereas non-informed traders, e.g. trend-followers or chartists in general,
can destabilize the market and induce bubble phenomena. Research in Heterogeneous
Agents Models [12, 13] has provided solid support to the thesis that when trading activity
is dominated by non-informed traders, bubbles and instabilities develop.
Our goal, here, is to establish a relation between market efficiency and the interplay
between informed and non-informed traders. Specifically, we provide support to the idea
that non-informed traders dominate if and only if the market is sufficiently close to infor-
mation efficiency. In addition, as markets become informationally efficient, they develop
a marked susceptibility to perturbations and instabilities.
Our discussion steps from the simple asset market model studied in [14], which describes
worse, so that financial markets are unable to channel funds efficiently to those with the most productive
investment opportunities.” [4, 5]. For an account of perverse effect which led to the 2007 – 2008 crisis in
credit markets, see for example [6].
2Specifically, [7] show that adding more and more Arrow’s securities in a market with heterogeneous
adaptive traders, brings the system to a dynamic instability. A similar conclusion was drawn in [8], though
based on different models. [9] discusses instead an equilibrium model and it shows that as the number
of possible trading instruments increases the market approaches the theoretical limit of complete markets
but allocations develop a marked sensitivity to price indeterminacy, and the volume of trading implied by
hedging in the interbank market diverges.
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a population of heterogeneous individuals, who receive a private signal on the return,
or dividend, of a given asset. Given their private signal, agents invest in the asset and
their demand determines the price, via market clearing. Agents learn how to optimally
exploit their private information in their trading activity, which has the effect that their
information is incorporated into prices. As the number N of agents with a different private
information increases, prices gradually converge to the returns. Beyond a critical number of
agents, prices converge exactly to returns. Therefore, the model provides a stylized picture
of how markets aggregate information into prices and become informationally efficient.
In this setting, we introduce non-informed agents who adopt the same learning dynam-
ics, but which base their decision on public information, rather than on a private signal.
In particular, we take the sign of the last return as public signal, which mimics a chartist
behavior, in its simplest form. Our main result is that chartists take over a sizable share
of market activity only when the market becomes informationally efficient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model and
the notation. In the following section we first recall the results with only informed traders
and then discuss the effect of introducing non-informed traders. The paper concludes with
a discussion of the extension and relevance of the results.
2 The model: Information efficiency and chartists
Let us consider a market where a single asset is being traded an infinite number of periods.
Let there be N informed traders (fundamentalists) and N ′ uninformed traders (chartists)
operating in the market. For simplicity, we assume that all uninformed traders adopt the
same trading strategy, so that the description of chartists can be given in terms of a single
representative agent. We thus set N ′ = 1 and we shall refer to the chartist representative
agent as agent i = 0.
In the market there are N units of asset available at each time and at the end of each
period the asset pays a return. The return depends only on the state of nature in that
period, ω = 1, . . . ,Ω, and is denoted by Rω. The state of nature is determined, in each
period, independently according to the uniform distribution on the integers 1, . . . ,Ω.
Traders do not observe the state directly, but informed traders (i = 1, . . . , N) receive a
signal on the state according to some fixed private information structure, which is deter-
mined at the initial time and remains fixed. More precisely, a signal is a function from the
state ω to a signal space, which for simplicity we assume to be M = {−,+}. We denote
by kωi ∈M the signal observed by trader i in state ω. The information structure available
to agent i is then encoded in the vector (kωi )ω∈Ω. Trader i = 0, instead, does not receive
any signal on the state ω, but she observes a public variable k0 ∈ {−1,+1}, such as the
sign of the last excess return: sign(Rω − pω).
We focus on a random realization of this setup, where the value of the return Rω in state
ω is drawn at random before the first period, and does not change afterwards. Returns
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thus only change because the state of nature changes. As in [14] we take Rω Gaussian
with mean R¯ and variance s2/N . Likewise, the information structure is determined by
setting kωi = +1 or −1 with equal probability, independently across traders i and states ω.
Appendix A discusses the information content of signals in more detail.
At the beginning of each period, a state ω and a public information k0 are drawn, and
private information kωi is revealed to informed agents (i > 0). All traders decide to invest
a monetary amount zmi in the asset: here m ∈M , for i > 0, takes the value of the signals
kωi which agent i > 0 receives, whereas it equals k0 for i = 0. The price of the asset p
ω,k0
is then derived from the market clearing condition
Npω,k0 =
N∑
i=1
∑
m=±1
zmi δkωi ,m +
∑
m=±1
zm0 δk0,m, (1)
where δi,j = 1 if i = j and δi,j = 0 otherwise. Agents do not know the price at which they
will buy the asset when they decide their investment zmi . The price depends on the state ω
and on k0 because the amount invested by each agent depends on the signal they receive,
which depends on ω [15, 16]. At the end of the period, each unit of asset pays a monetary
amount Rω. If agent i has invested zmi units of money, he will hold z
m
i /p
ω,k0 units of asset,
so the expected payoff of agents is
ui(zi) =
1
Ω
∑
ω
∑
m
δkωi ,mz
m
i
(
Rω
pω,k0
− 1
)
. (2)
How will agents choose their investments? One can consider either competitive equilib-
ria or take a dynamical approach where agents are assumed to learn over time how to invest
optimally. As in [14] these two different choices are going to bring to the same equilibria,
so we focus on the latter. In particular, each informed agent i > 0 has a propensity to
invest Umi (t) for each of the signals m = ±1. His investment zmi = χ(Umi ) at time t is an
increasing function of Umi (t) (χ : R → R+) with χ(x) → 0 if x → −∞ and χ(x) → ∞ if
x → ∞. After each period agents update Umi (t) according to the marginal success of the
investment:
Umi (t+ 1) = U
m
i (t) +
(
Rωt − pωt,k0t
)
δkωti ,m
− 
N
, i = 1, . . . , N (3)
where ωt is the state at time t and p
ωt,k0
t is the realized price. The idea in Eq. (3) is that
if for a given signal m agent i observes returns Rω which are higher that prices, she will
increase her propensity Umi to invest under that signal. At odds with [14], the learning
dynamics for informed agents (i > 0) also takes into account the cost of information,
through the term . More precisely, investment is considered attractive (Umi > 0) only
if the returns under signal m exceed prices by more than . Similarly, the non-informed
agent updates her propensity to trade according to
Um0 (t+ 1) = U
m
0 (t) +
(
Rωt − pωt,k0t
)
δk0,m (4)
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Figure 1: Top panel: distance |p − R| =
√∑Ω
ω=1 Ek0 [R
ω − pω,k0 ]2 of prices from returns in competitive
equilibrium. The full line represents the analytical solution for the case s = R = 1 and  = 0.1, points refer
to numerical simulations of systems with Ω = 32, s = R = 1 and  = 0.1. Bottom panel: monetary amount
invested by the trend follower z0 for the same values of the parameters.
and invests an amount zm0 = χ(U
m
0 ), depending on the value m = k0 of public information
at time t.
3 Results
In this section we study the typical properties of the market introduced above in the limit
N → ∞, Ω → ∞ and n = NΩ finite, where the characterisation of the system can be
achieved through a statistical mechanics approach.
Let us briefly recall the behavior of the market in the absence (z0 = 0) of non-informed
traders and  = 0. [14] show that the learning dynamics converges to the allocations {zmi }
which correspond to the solution of the minimization of the function
H =
1
2
Ω∑
ω=1
(Rω − pω)2 , pω = 1
N
N∑
i=1
∑
m=±1
zmi δkωi ,m. (5)
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Figure 2: Top panel: monetary amount invested by the trend follower. Bottom panel: monetary amount
invested by a fundamentalist in presence (blue points) or absence (green diamonds) of the trend follower.
Points refer to simulations of systems with Ω = 32, n = 4 and s = R = 1. Full lines represent the
corresponding analytical solution.
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The function H is the squared distance of prices from returns. As more and more different
types of informed agents enter the market prices approach returns. There is a critical
value nc of informed traders beyond which H = 0, which implies that prices equal returns
(pω = Rω) for each state ω = 1, . . . ,Ω. As discussed in Appendix A, this corresponds to the
strong form of market information efficiency, when all private information is incorporated
into prices.
The region H = 0 is also characterized by a divergent susceptibility, which means that
allocations {zmi } have a marked dependence on structural parameters. The susceptibility Φ
relates a small uncertainty in a structural parameter, such as e.g. Rω, to the uncertainty in
allocations δzmi ' ΦδRω. A divergent susceptibility Φ→∞ signals the fact that equilibria
with different allocations are possible even for the same structural parameters, i.e. that
the minimum of Eq. (5) is not unique.
What happens when we introduce chartists (z0 > 0) and information costs ( > 0)?
First we find that allocations {zmi ≥ 0}i=0,...,N are again given by the solution of the
minimization of a function, which takes the form
H =
1
2
Ω∑
ω=1
Ek0
[
Rω − pω,k0
]2
+

2N
N∑
i=1
∑
m=±1
zmi , (6)
where pω,k0 is given in Eq. (1) in terms of zmi , i = 0, . . . , N , m = ±1. The proof proceeds,
on one side, by taking the partial derivatives of H with respect to z
m
i and analyzing
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the minimization of H. These tell us that if the partial
derivative of H vanishes in the minimum, then z
m
i > 0. Otherwise, if the derivative is
positive, then zmi = 0. On the other side, one easily finds that
∂H
∂zmi
= −Ek0,ω [Umi (t+ 1)− Umi (t)] (7)
which implies that the Kuhn-Tucker conditions correspond exactly to the conditions for
the stationary state (with Umi → −∞ when zmi = 0).
This result paves the way for the extension of the statistical mechanics approach to
this case. Some simple heuristic arguments can be useful in order to understand the basic
behaviour of the system. Let us consider the case of small  and small n. Then the first
term in Eq. (6) dominates the second and the minimum is expected to be close to that
without chartists. When n increases, however, the value of H decreases making the two
terms comparable. When this happens, i.e. when n ≈ nc and H ≈ 0, then it starts to
become possible to achieve a small value of H by decreasing the size of the second term
increasing, at the same time, zm0 in order to keep average prices of the same order of
average returns. Hence we expect zm0 to be large and of order N when the market becomes
close to information efficient. The results of numerical simulations as well as the analytical
solution for competitive market equilibrium (see Appendix B for more details), shown in
Fig. 1, confirm this picture. Upon increasing the number of informed agents, the system
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undergoes a transition from inefficient to efficient market. Correspondingly, the share of
trades due to uninformed agent starts raising only once information has been aggregated
by informed traders. It has to be noticed that the introduction of the information cost 
makes sure that a perfect efficiency of the market is recovered only at  = 0. It is then
instructive to look at the behaviour of the chartists as a function of . Figure 2 shows
signatures of a phase transition occurring at  = 0. Indeed, for  < 0 the chartists barely
operates in the market, while they start trading as soon as  > 0.
4 Conclusions
We have shown that, in a simple asset market model, non-informed traders contribute
a non-negligible fraction of the trading activity only when the market becomes informa-
tionally efficient. In the simple setting studied here, non-informed traders do not have
a destabilizing effect on the market as in the models of [12]. At the same time, when
non-informed traders dominate, their activity does not spoil information efficiency. Never-
theless, we can see from our analysis that information efficiency is associated with a phase
transition in the statistical mechanics sense, characterised by strong fluctuations and sharp
discontinuities in the optimal allocations. This suggests that market efficiency carries in
fact some seeds of instability.
Moreover, when combined with the insights of the literature on Heterogeneous Agent Mod-
els [12], the very fact that non-informed traders start trading massively when market effi-
ciency is approached in fact suggests that information efficiency can trigger the occurrence
of bubbles and instabilities. This issue has been also addressed in [17] recently, however
the analysis was limited to a single type of fundamentalist (N = 1 in our case) and one
type of trend followers. A stronger case would require first to extend the framework of [12]
to the case of fundamentalists with many different types of private information, recovering
a picture for information efficiency similar to that provided by [14]. Then one should inves-
tigate the effect of introducing non-informed traders, i.e. genuine trend-followers. Besides
understanding whether information efficiency is also in that case a necessary condition for
non-informed traders to dominate, one could also address the interesting question of the
effect of chartists on information efficiency.
Ultimately, our results suggest that excessive insistence on information efficiency in
market regulation policies , as e.g. in the debate on the Tobin tax [18], could have the
unintended consequence of propelling financial bubbles, such as those which have plagued
international financial markets in the recent decades.
A Information structures and information efficiency
Form the information theoretic point of view, the content of the signal kωi can be quantified
in one bit. Indeed, the entropy of the unconditional distribution over states, which is log Ω,
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is reduced to log(Ω/2) by the knowledge of the signal kωi . Hence, the information gain is
log 2, i.e. one bit. This information gain allows agent i to discriminate between two
different conditional distributions of returns, whose means E[Rω|kωi = ±1] are separated
by an amount of order 1/N . Indeed, for any two states ω and ω′, by assumption Rω−Rω′ ∼
1/
√
N . Now take the average over the states ω and ω′ such that kωi = +1 and k
ω′
i = −1
respectively. Given that the expected value of Rω and Rω
′
are the same, one finds that the
average of the difference is of the order of the standard deviation of Rω, times the square
root of the number Ω/2 of samples, i.e.
|E[Rω|kωi = +1]− E[Rω|kωi = −1]| ∼ s/
√
NΩ/2 ∼ 1/N.
This difference is of the same order of the contribution of agents to the price pω, hence
it allows to differentiate meaningfully their investments zmi , depending on the signal they
receive.
Let us now discuss market efficiency. A market is efficient with respect to an information
set if the public revelation of that information would not change the prices of the securities
[10]. This means that the best prediction of future returns (or prices), conditional on the
information set, are present (discounted) prices. Strong efficiency refers to the case where
the information set includes the information available to any of the participants in the
market, including private information.
In our case, an agent who knew simultaneously the signals kωi of all agents would be
able to know the state ω, with probability one, for Ω ∝ N and N →∞.
Indeed let N= be the number of pair of states ω and ω
′ which cannot be distinguished
on the basis of the knowledge of all signals. For such pair of states, kωi = k
ω′
i must hold
for all i, because otherwise there would be a signal kωi 6= kω
′
i which allows to distinguish
ω from ω′. The probability P{N= > 0} that there are at least two states ω and ω′ with
different returns Rω 6= Rω′ , but which cannot be distinguished given the signals, is upper
bounded by the expected value of N=. The latter can be easily evaluated, since for each
pair of states the probability of them not being distinguishable is P{kωi = kω
′
i , ∀i} = 2−N .
The number of pairs is Ω(Ω− 1)/2 so that
P{N= > 0} ≤ E[N=] = Ω(Ω− 1)2−(N+1),
and this vanishes for N →∞ in the case Ω ∝ N we consider here. We conclude that, if all
signals were revealed, agents would be able to know which state ω has materialized. In this
case, prices would not change only if pω = Rω for all states ω. Hence H = 0 is equivalent
to the strong form of information efficiency [19].
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B The statistical mechanics analysis
The competitive equilibrium solution of our problem can be obtained through the minimi-
sation of the following Hamiltonian function
H =
N2
4Ω
∑
ω,k0
(Rω − pω,k0)2 + 
2
∑
i,m
zmi , (8)
with pω,k0 = 1N
∑
i,m z
m
i δkωi ,m+
∑
k0
z
k0
0
N . In order to compute the minima of H we introduce
the partition function
Z(β) =
∫ ∞
0
dz+0
∫ ∞
0
dz−0 · · ·
∫ ∞
0
dz+N
∫ ∞
0
dz−Ne
−βH{zmi }. (9)
In the limit β → ∞ integrals are dominated by those configurations {zmi } that minimise
the Hamiltonian. The central quantity to compute is the free energy fβ = −β−1 logZ(β),
which has to be averaged over the realisations of the disorder, namely {kωi , Rω}. In the
following we are going to consider kωi = ±1 with equal probability ∀ i, ω, and we take
Rω = R + R˜√
N
, where R˜ are Gaussian variables with zero mean and variance equal to s2.
In order to compute the average over the disorder 〈fβ〉 we can resort to the so called replica
trick through the identity logZ = limM→0(ZM − 1)/M . The problem reduces then to that
of computing the average over the disorder of the partition function of M non interacting
replicas of the system:〈
ZM
〉
=
〈
Tr{z}
∏
a
δ
(
NR−
∑
i
zi,a − z0,a
)
×
e
−β
[∑
a,ω,k0(NR
ω−∑i,m zmi δkωi ,m−zk00 )2+∑i,a z+i,a+z−i,a2
]〉
,
with a ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ω ∈ {1, . . . ,Ω}, m ∈ {−1, 1} and k0 ∈ {−1, 1} and
zi.a = (z
+
i,a + z
−
i,a)/2 . We verified through numerical simulations that, for the specific
public signal k0 that we considered in this paper,
〈
z+0
〉
=
〈
z−0
〉
so, in order to simplify
the calculation, we make the assumption z+0 = z
−
0 = z0. After performing a Hubbard-
Stratonovich transformation in order to linearize the quadratic term of the Hamiltonian,
taking the average over the quenched variables introduces an effective interaction between
replicas:
〈Zn〉 =
〈∫
{dQa,b}{dQˆa,b}{dRˆ}Tr{z}
e−
∑
a,b Qˆa,b(NQa,b−
∑
i ∆
a
i ∆
b
i)−
∑
a Rˆa(NR−
∑
i zi,a−z0,a) ×
e
−βN/Ω∑a,b,ω(R˜ω)2(βQa,bα +δa,b)−1−β∑i,a zi,a ×
e
−Ω
2
Tr log
(
βQa,b
α
+δa,b
)〉
,
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where we have introduced the overlap matrix Qa,b and the variables ∆i.a = (z
+
i,a − z−i,a)/2,
while Qˆa,b and Rˆa are conjugated variables that come from integral representations of δ
functions:
δ(X −X0) ∝
∫
dXˆe−Xˆ(X−X0). (10)
In order to make further progress we consider the replica symmetric ansatz, namely we
take
Qa,b = q0 + α
Φ
β
δa,b (11)
Qˆa,b = −β
2qˆ0
α2
+
β2qˆ0/α
2 + βw/α
2
δa,b (12)
The resulting expression is handled in such a way to be able to use saddle point methods
in the limit N, β → ∞ (see [8] for more details on a similar calculation). The final result
is given in terms of the free energy
f(q0,Φ, qˆ0, w, Rˆ, z0) =
s2 + q0
1 + Φ
+ 2
RˆR
α
− 2Rˆz0
α
+
Φqˆ0
α
− wq0
α
+
2
α
〈
minz≥0 {V (z)}
〉
t
, (13)
with the potential V (z) given by
V (z) =
w
2
∆2 −
√
qˆ0t∆− Rˆz + z (14)
and where we used 〈· · · 〉t to denote averages over the normal variable t. The corresponding
saddle point equations are
w =
α
1 + Φ
(15)
qˆ0 =
α(s2 + q0)
(1 + Φ)2
(16)
R = z0 + 〈∆∗〉t (17)
q0 = 〈∆∗2〉t (18)
Φ =
〈t∆∗〉t√
qˆ0
(19)
Rˆ = 0, (20)
where
∆∗(t) = θ(t− τ)
√
qˆ0
w
(t− τ) + θ(−t− τ)
√
qˆ0
w
(−t− τ) (21)
τ =
√
qˆ0
. (22)
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Using these equations it is possible to compute 〈H〉 = q0+s2(1+Φ)2 . It is useful to define the
three functions
ψr(τ) = 2
∫ ∞
τ
dte−t
2/2(t− τ) =
√
2
pi
e−τ
2/2 − τerfc
(
τ√
2
)
(23)
ψq(τ) = 2
∫ ∞
τ
dte−t
2/2(t− τ)2 = (1 + τ2)erfc
(
τ√
2
)
−
√
2
pi
τe−τ
2/2 (24)
ψΦ(τ) = 2
∫ ∞
τ
dte−t
2/2t(t− τ) = erfc
(
τ√
2
)
(25)
It is now possible to express equations (17), (18) and (19) in terms of these non-linear
functions.We can now look for a parametric solution in terms of τ , and consider α as an
independent variable. From the definition of τ we have qˆ0 = 
2/τ2. Inserting equation (15)
into equation (19) we find
α =
1 + Φ
Φ
ψΦ(τ), (26)
while from equation (18) we get
q0 =
2
τ2
ψq(τ)
ψ2Φ(τ)
Φ2. (27)
Inserting these expressions into equation (16) we obtain
2
τ2
=
s2ψΦ(τ)
Φ(1 + Φ)
+
2
τ2
ψq(τ)Φ
ψΦ(τ)(1 + Φ)
, (28)
from which
Φ± =
−1±
√
1 + 4ψΦ(τ)s2
τ2
2
(
1− ψq(τ)ψΦ(τ)
)
2(1− ψq(τ)/ψΦ(τ)) . (29)
Since Φ has the meaning of a distance between replicas the only physical solution is Φ = Φ+.
Inserting this expression for Φ in the previous equations makes possible to express all order
parameters and α in terms of the functions ψr, ψq, ψΦ and of the free parameters  and τ .
A parametric solution can be found also for the case of α fixed and  variable. From
equation (19) we find
Φ =
ψΦ(τ)
α− ψΦ(τ) . (30)
From equation (18)
q0 =
2
τ2
(1 + Φ)2
α2
ψq(τ). (31)
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Finally, inserting this expression in equation (16) we can now express  as:
2
τ2
=
αs2
(1 + Φ)2
1
1− ψq(τ)α
. (32)
As before, using this expression, is now possible to write the order parameters in terms of
ψr, ψq, ψΦ and of the free parameters α and τ .
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